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There are currently no fewer than four dedicated logics for equality reasoning over nominal
sets: nominal algebra, nominal equational logic, nominal equational logic with equality
only, and permissive-nominal algebra.
In this survey and research paper we present these logics side-by-side in a common
notation, survey their similarities and differences, discuss their proof- and model-theories,
and discuss in detail what the implications of those differences are for mathematical
reasoning in each of them.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Nominal sets for names and binding
Nominal sets, introduced in [33], are a particularly abstract and effective way of giving semantics to names and binding
(for a deﬁnition see Section 4). Suppose you want to axiomatise capture-avoiding substitution [a := t] over a calculus (a logic
or rewrite system) with a binder—call it, say, λ. Then you will almost certainly write this:
(λx.r)[y := t] = λx.(r[y := t]) if x is not free in t
You might also write ‘choose y fresh and α-rename λx.r to λy.(r[y/x])’.
Nominal sets were developed to interpret these kinds of assertions [33]; names, binding, fresh choice of names, and
α-renaming become primitives of the denotation. They are represented directly, rather than e.g. as de Bruijn indexes [10],
functional abstraction [39], or Bourbaki’s boxes and links notation [1, Section 1].
Once nominal sets are established it is only a matter of time before we develop term and predicate languages to describe
them. The term language came in the form of nominal terms [40]. The ﬁrst predicate language for nominal terms was
actually nominal rewriting [15] but the ﬁrst ‘logical’ language (focussed on derivability) was nominal algebra—followed by
nominal equational logic, then permissive-nominal algebra and nominal equational logic with equality only (also permissive-
nominal logic, which adds quantiﬁers [11,12]).
In nominal algebra and nominal equational logic, the two fragments above can be represented as follows (nominal
rewriting would be just the same, but with → instead of =):
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• b#X  λ[b](ba) · X = λ[a]X .
The permissive-nominal version replaces the freshness condition ‘a#X ’ with a typing condition that a /∈A< , where A< and
A
> partition A into two inﬁnite subsets:
• (λ[a]Z)[b → X] = λ[a](Z [b → X]) (where a /∈A< and b ∈A<).
• λ[b](ba) · X = λ[a]X (where b /∈A<).
See Section 3.4 in this paper or [11–14].1
Details follow; our point here is that this family of logics is designed to represent, more-or-less symbol-for-symbol,
informal reasoning on speciﬁcations with binders. Here are some examples, just to prove that such speciﬁcations occur and
are useful: quantiﬁers in logic (∀), functional abstraction in the λ-calculus (λ), integration (∫ ), and name-restriction in the
π -calculus (ν).
Names and binding matter, and logics for equality over nominal sets matter because equality reasoning is prototypical
for serious and usable meta-reasoning systems.
1.2. Four logics for equality
A glance at the literature reveals no fewer than four logics for equational reasoning over nominal sets:
• nominal algebra (NA) as presented e.g. in [24,26–28,30],
• nominal equational logic (NEL) as presented e.g. in [5,8],
• NEL with equality only [5,7], and
• permissive-nominal algebra (PNA) [22,32].2
This raises the question of why we need these logics, what their distinctive features are, how they can be applied, and to
what extent they are saying the same thing.
In fact, these logics are all just different ways of approaching the same mathematical entity, much as there are many
different and equivalent choices of connectives for setting up ﬁrst-order logic. They do differ in complexity; which in de-
creasing order are (according to this author, at least): NEL, NEL with equality only, NA, and PNA.
It is quite hard to get an overview of this design space from individual research papers, since these tend to concentrate
on the demands of the particular theorems at hand. Thus there seems to be a space in the literature for a paper dedicated
speciﬁcally to presenting what equational reasoning over nominal sets looks like, to chart the development of the various
logics, and to discuss how the author’s own work on NA and PNA ﬁts in to the larger picture.
The discussion and theorems in this paper do not just matter for this family of logics. The design choices being made
here may be prototypical for the design of any logic over nominal sets; these choices should be informed by a rich and
detailed understanding of the design space, to which we hope this paper can contribute.
1.3. Structure of the paper
The structure of the paper is as follows:
• In Section 2 we introduce nominal terms.
• In Section 3 we present nominal algebra, nominal equational logic, nominal equational logic with equality only, and
permissive-nominal algebra, and in Section 3.5 we give a ﬁrst discussion of them.
• Denotations in nominal sets are considered in Section 4, and these are used as a mathematical foundation for a discus-
sion of semantic freshness in nominal algebra and translation of NEL to NA in Section 5.
• Section 6 includes an extended and detailed discussion of the design issues involved in designing algebra over nominal
sets, with a particular focus on how Clouston and Pitts’s evaluation of NA has been consistently wide of the mark, from
[8] to [7].
• Section 7 focuses on the more recent permissive-nominal algebra by this author with Dowek and Mulligan. This is a more
recent system and we do not give many proofs, focussing instead on giving some useful idea of how the permissive-
nominal techniques slot in to the broader territory and why it was developed.
• Section 8 more brieﬂy discusses a key feature of nominal techniques, namely, the ability to talk about name-abstraction.
• We conclude with brief sketches of two other ‘nominal’ logics in Section 9 and a concluding discussion in Section 10.
1 The advantage of the permissive syntax is that a mutable freshness context is replaced by a static typing condition and permissive-nominal syntax can
be directly quotiented by α-equivalence.
2 Cousins of these logics are the Synthetic Nominal Equational Logic of Fiore and Hur [17] and the presentation of nominal terms as many-sorted ﬁrst-order
terms by Kurz and Petris¸an [36], which we shall also consider, brieﬂy, in Section 9.
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Deﬁnition 2.1. For each natural number i ∈ N = {0,1,2, . . .} ﬁx a disjoint set of atoms Ai . Let a,b, c range over distinct
atoms.3
Deﬁnition 2.2. Fix a signature  = (AtomicSort,BaseSort,TermFormer,ar) which is a tuple of a set of atomic sorts ν ⊆ N,
base sorts τ , a set of term-formers f, and an arity function mapping each f to a tuple ar(f) = (α1, . . . ,αn)τ where αi range
over atomic or base sorts.
f, g will range over distinct term-formers. α will range over atomic or base sorts, or just sorts for short.
For each sort α ﬁx a countably inﬁnite set of variables of that sort. X , Y , Z will range over distinct variables and we
write sort(X) for the sort of X .
Remark 2.3. Elsewhere, such as in [7,8,15,30,40], atoms-abstraction sorts [ν]τ are also considered. As noted in [30] and [6]
this adds no expressivity, so we omit abstraction sorts here. This is only for simplicity.
Deﬁnition 2.4. A permutation is a bijection on atoms such that nontriv(π) = {a | π(a) = a} is ﬁnite and π(a) ∈ Aν if and
only if a ∈Aν . Write P for the set of all permutations.
Write id for the identity permutation and ◦ for composition of permutations. Write π−1 for inverse.
Deﬁnition 2.5. Nominal terms are inductively deﬁned by:
r ::= a | π · X | f(r, . . . , r)
We deﬁne a sorting relation r : α by:
(a ∈Aν)
a : ν
(sort(X) = α)
π · X : α
r1 : α1 · · · rn : αn (ar(f) = (α1, . . . ,αn)τ )
f(r1, . . . , rn) : τ
Notation 2.6. It is not hard to show that sorts are unique where they exist. Write sort(r) = α when r : α and call r well-
sorted when r : α for some α. We are only interested in well-sorted terms, so henceforth we restrict to well-sorted terms.
Remark 2.7. a is an atom representing a name (e.g. an object-level variable symbol, a channel name, a memory location,
and so on). π · X is a pair of π and X and is called a moderated unknown; and f(r1, . . . , rn) is a term-former applied to
terms.
Example 2.8. Assume one atomic type ν , one base type τ , and term-formers var, app, and lam where ar(var) = (ν)τ ,
ar(app) = (τ , τ )τ , and ar(lam) = (ν, τ )τ .
Terms of the untyped λ-calculus can be represented by var(a) (variable symbols), app(r′, r) (application), and lam(a, r)
(lambda-abstraction), all of which are terms of sort τ . See also Section 3.5 (a theory of functions).
Deﬁnition 2.9. Deﬁne a permutation action on a nominal term as follows:
π · a = π(a) π · (π ′ · X)= (π ◦π ′) · X π · f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(π · r1, . . . ,π · rn)
Deﬁnition 2.10. A substitution θ is a map from unknowns to terms. Give terms a substitution action as follows:
aθ = a (π · X)θ = π · θ(X) f(r1, . . . , rn)θ = f(r1θ, . . . , rnθ)
Deﬁnition 2.11. Deﬁne a notion of variables of a nominal term4 as follows:
vars(a) =∅ vars(π · X) = {X} vars(f(r1, . . . , rn)
)=
n⋃
1
vars(ri)
Deﬁnition 2.12. A freshness context 	 is a ﬁnite set of freshness assumptions a#X .
3 So a, b, c are meta-variables ranging over distinct atoms. Call this the permutative convention (which goes back to [26,29]); it accurately models what
we mean when we write e.g. λx.λy.xy.
4 Our nominal terms syntax has no binder for X . For that, see permissive-nominal logic [11,22].
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T;	 NA r = r
T;	 NA r = s T;	 NA s = t
(Trans)
T;	 NA r = t
T;	 NA r = s
(Symm)
T;	 NA s = r
(a /∈ fa	(r), b /∈ fa	(r))
(Perm)
T;	 NA (a b) · r = r
(∀X .fa	′ (θ(X)) ⊆ fa	(X),
(	  r=s)∈T)
(Axr=s)
T;	′ NA π · (rθ) = π · (sθ)
T;	 NA ri = si (1 i n)
(Cong)
T;	 NA f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(s1, . . . , sn)
T;	,a#X NA r = s (a /∈ atms(r, s))
(Fresh)
T;	 NA r = s
Fig. 1. Derivable entailment in nominal algebra (NA).
3. Equality reasoning over nominal terms
3.1. Nominal algebra
We need some notation to help us express the notion of derivable equalities in nominal algebra (Deﬁnition 3.6).
Deﬁnition 3.1. If A ⊆A is a set of atoms, deﬁne π · A = {π(a) | a ∈ A}.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Deﬁne a notion of free atoms of a nominal term (in a freshness context) fa	(r) as follows:
fa	(a) = {a} fa	(π · X) = π · {a | a#X /∈ 	} fa	
(
f(r1, . . . , rn)
)=
n⋃
1
fa	(ri)
‘Free atoms of’ is parameterised over 	. For example,
fa{a#X,b#X,c#Y }(X) =A \ {a,b}
Remark 3.3. In [15,40] and elsewhere, the judgement a /∈ fa	(r) is written 	  a#r. This is purely a matter of notation; see
Section 6.1 for a further discussion of this.
We need one more freshness deﬁnition; in [30] it is written a /∈ r and in [8] it is written a#r:
Deﬁnition 3.4. Deﬁne atms(r) the atoms appearing in r inductively by:
atms(a) = {a} atms(π · X) = nontriv(π) atms(f(r1, . . . , rn)
)=
n⋃
1
atms(ri)
Remark 3.5. Having two freshness judgements, a /∈ fa	(r) and a /∈ atms(r), is an artefact of using a ‘primitive’ name-
carrying syntax. In permissive-nominal techniques as presented in [22], a /∈ fa	(r) and a /∈ atms(r) coincide. So by promoting
permissive-nominal techniques, this author is trying to move the literature towards a world in which Deﬁnitions 3.2 and 3.4
are conﬂated (cf. Remark 6.4). Since this paper is partly a survey, we have to faithfully represent the tools we used at the
time.
Deﬁnition 3.6. A nominal equality E is a tuple 	  l = r.
A nominal algebra theory T is a signature along with a set of nominal equalities in that signature.
The derivable equalities T;	 NA r = s are generated by the rules in Fig. 1.
3.2. Nominal equational logic
Nominal equational logic adds a semantic freshness judgement.
Deﬁnition 3.7. A nominal freshness is a tuple 	  a#r. A nominal freshness axiom is a nominal freshness. A nominal
equational logic theory U is a signature along with a set of freshness or equality axioms in that signature.
The derivable equalities and freshnesses U;	 NEL r = s and U;	 NEL a#r are generated by the rules in Fig. 2.
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U;	 NEL r = r
U;	 NEL r = s U;	 NEL s = t
(Trans=)
U;	 NEL r = t
U;	 NEL r = s
(Symm)
U;	 NEL s = r
U;	 NEL r = s U;	 NEL a#r
(Trans#)
U;	 NEL a#s
a#X ∈ 	
(#Ax)
U;	 NEL π(a)#π · X
U;	 NEL ri = si (1 i n)
(Cong)
U;	 NEL f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(s1, . . . , sn)
U;	,a#X NEL r = s (a /∈ atms(r, s))
(Fresh)
U;	 NEL r = s
U;	 NEL a#r U;	 NEL b#r
(Perm)
U;	 NEL (a b) · r = r
U;	 NEL a#ri (1 i n)
(#1)
U;	 NEL a#f(r1, . . . , rn)
(#2)
U;	 NEL a#b
U;	′ NEL a#θ(X) every a#X ∈ 	 ((	  r = s) ∈ U)
(Axr=s)
U;	′ NEL π · (rθ) = π · (sθ)
U;	′ NEL a#θ(X) every a#X ∈ 	 ((	  a#r) ∈ U)
(Axa#r)
U;	′ NEL π(a)#π · (rθ)
Fig. 2. Derivable entailment in nominal equational logic (NEL).
Remark 3.8. For the beneﬁt of the interested reader, we compare the rules in Fig. 2 and those in e.g. Fig. 5.1 of [5], where
Nominal Equational Logic is presented in Clouston’s thesis. This is not intended to be a formal proof of equivalence, but it
should make ‘obvious’ that the we are talking about the same mathematical object, if differently presented.
• (Reﬂ), (Symm), and (Trans=) and (Trans#) in Fig. 2 correspond to (reﬂ), (symm), and (trans) from [5, Fig. 5.1].
• (Cong), (#1), and (#2) taken together correspond to (subst), which is a single complex rule expressing intersubsti-
tutability of derivably equal terms (the complexity of having three rules being offset by the complexity implicit in the
arbitrary substitution used in (subst); for our purposes, the more ‘expanded’ version is much easier to prove things
about).
• (weak) from Fig. 5.1 is an admissible rule of Fig. 2; we build weakening into (#Ax) here, whereas in Fig. 5.1 it is an
explicit rule plus a ‘non-weakened’ freshness axiom rule (≈/ -equivar).
• (atm-intro) from Fig. 5.1 has no direct counterpart in Fig. 2; it is a product of the more structured sequent used in [5]
which combines equality with freshness judgements.
Our design decision, to split the judgement-form from [5] into separate freshness and equality judgements, seems to us
the simpler and more elementary approach, but it is in any case purely a matter of presentation.
• (atm-elim) from Fig. 5.1 corresponds to (Fresh) in Fig. 2; the side-condition a#(∇, a¯, t, t′) from (atm-elim) corresponds
the side-condition a /∈ atms(r, s) in (Fresh).
There is one slight difference, that (atm-elim) requires you to add your freshness assumptions all at once, whereas
(Fresh) allows you to add them one at a time. This is purely a design decision (cf. [30, Remark 3.8]).
• (≈/ -equivar) is an admissible rule corresponding as discussed above to the speciﬁc design of (#Ax).
• (susp) from Fig. 5.1 corresponds to (Perm) from Fig. 2.
• The two axiom rules in Fig. 2 are not explicitly written out in Fig. 5.1, but are understood to be admitted ‘as axioms’.
Remark 3.9. One difference between the NEL of Fig. 2 and the NEL of Fig. 5.1 in [5] is that Clouston and Pitts admitted
signatures of non-equivariant term-formers (so π · f(r1, . . . , rn) = (π · f)(π · r1, . . . ,π · rn)), whereas we do not and we keep
signatures equivariant (so π · f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(π · r1, . . . ,π · rn)).
So the NEL of this paper is a ‘core NEL’ which is actually a bit simpler than the NEL in the literature. What may
surprise some readers is a point that appears to not be widely appreciated: we lose no expressivity in the simpliﬁcation.
See Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.5
5 A referee suggested viewing the NEL and NEL with equality only in this paper as two new systems, inspired by the NEL of [8] and the NEL with
equality only of [5]. These have similar properties; e.g. NEL has an explicit freshness judgement and is sound and complete with respect to both equality
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U;	 NELeo r = r
U;	 NELeo r = s U;	 NELeo s = t
(Trans=)
U;	 NELeo r = t
U;	 NELeo r = s
(Symm)
U;	 NELeo s = r
U;	 NELeo ri = si (1 i n)
(Cong)
U;	 NELeo f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(s1, . . . , sn)
U;	,a#X NELeo r = s (a /∈ atms(r, s))
(Fresh)
U;	 NELeo r = s
(a,b /∈ atms(r))
(Perm)
U;	,a#vars(r),b#vars(r) NELeo (a b) · r = r
U;	′,b#vars(r, s) NELeo (b a) · θ(X) = θ(X) every a#X ∈ 	
(	  r = s) ∈ U)
(Axr=s)
U;	′ NELeo π · (rθ) = π · (sθ)
Fig. 3. Derivable entailment in nominal equational logic with Equality Only (NELeo).
Remark 3.10. We now compare Figs. 1 and 2. The rules (Axa#r) and (Trans#) add axioms and equational reasoning for
freshness, relative to the NA system from Fig. 1. The rules (#1) and (#2) in Fig. 2 also do not feature in Fig. 1.
The rules (#1) and (#2) are needed here, and they are not part of some inductive deﬁnition e.g. like we saw in Deﬁni-
tions 3.2 or 3.4. Axioms can change what freshnesses are derivable; no axiom can change fa	(r) or atms(r).
So for instance, in conjunction with appropriate axioms, the NEL freshness judgement is undecidable. For instance we
can axiomatise some computation using a term r that returns a if it terminates. Then  a#r judges whether r terminates
(if r does not terminate, then it is equal to the diverging function).
3.3. Nominal equational logic with equality only
We need just a little notation, which will also be useful later:
Notation 3.11. Write 	,a#vars(r) for 	 ∪ {a#X | X ∈ vars(r)}.
Deﬁnition 3.12. A nominal equational logic with equality only theory U is a signature along with a set of equality axioms
(no freshness axioms) in that signature.
The derivable equalities U;	 NELeo r = s are generated by the rules in Fig. 3.
Remark 3.13. The presentation here is a rendering of Fig. 1 from [7]. Fig. 1 in [7] seems shorter than Fig. 3 here, but its
presentation uses plenty of macros and sugar. For instance, to unpack the notation used in subst from Fig. 1 of [7] requires
all of p. 5 from [7]. The presentation here is more explicit, and also perhaps a little simpler too.
Remark 3.14. Comparing Figs. 2 and 3, note the different treatment of the (Perm) rule, which in Fig. 3 seems to have
some overlap with (Fresh); similarly for the (Ax) rule. NEL with equality only is more proﬂigate than NEL or NA with its
generation of fresh resources.
3.4. Permissive-nominal algebra
Deﬁnition 3.15. Choose a ﬁxed, arbitrary, and computable partition of A into two countably inﬁnite halves A< and A> , so
that A=A< unionmultiA> .6 We can do this since we assumed that A was countably inﬁnite.
and freshness, but they leave out the orthogonal issue of non-equivariant function symbols. I agree, except that I do not think one should sell, or appear to
sell, something as a new system, just for a relatively minor change of signature.
6 A fancy mathematician’s name for this is moiety, meaning ‘partition into two equal halves’ (from the French moitié).
When this idea was ﬁrst introduced to the nominal literature, the referees loathed it. They found a partition arbitrary. Where did it come from? How
was it computed? Why do we need to make an arbitrary choice? This was eventually solved by taking the set of atoms to be deﬁned as A = A< unionmulti A> ,
instead of taking the set of atoms and then partitioning it arbitrarily. If A had already been chosen, as is the case in this paper, then we specify that the
moiety is computable and all is well.
Perhaps this is an interesting litmus test to check whether you are talking to a mathematician or a computer scientist. Tell a mathematician ‘partition
this set’ and he says ‘OK’. Tell a computer scientist the same thing and he says ‘How?’.
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V PNA r = r
V PNA r = s V PNA s = t
(Trans)
V PNA r = t
V PNA r = s
(Symm)
V PNA s = r
(a /∈ fa(r), b /∈ fa(r))
(Perm)
V PNA (b a) · r = r
V;	 PNA ri = si (1 i n)
(Cong)
V;	 PNA f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(s1, . . . , sn)
((r=s)∈V)
(Axr=s)
V PNA π · (rθ) = π · (sθ)
Fig. 4. Derivable entailment in permissive-nominal Algebra (PNA).
Deﬁnition 3.16. Deﬁne a notion of permissive free atoms of a nominal term fa(r) as follows:
fa(a) = {a} fa(π · X) = π ·A< fa(f(r1, . . . , rn)
)=
n⋃
1
fa(ri)
Deﬁnition 3.17. A permissive-nominal equality E is a pair l = r.
A permissive-nominal algebra theory V is a signature along with a set of permissive-nominal equalities in that signature.
The derivable equalities V PNA r = s are generated by the rules in Fig. 4.
3.5. Expressivity
Atoms-as-constants and atoms inequality. One feature of nominal terms languages is that they treat atoms as a kind of
bindable and permutable constant symbol. So note that distinct atoms a and b in the syntax actually denote distinct atoms
in the denotation. Thus if ν is an atomic sort then we can axiomatise atoms-inequality as a binary term-former neq : (ν, ν)o
with axioms
 neq(a,b) =   neq(a,a) = ⊥
along with appropriate term-formers and equalities for  : o and ⊥ : o. If atoms behaved more like variables, so that ‘a could
be equal to b’, then this would not make sense.
Non-equivariant term-formers can be emulated. Signatures are equivariant in that π commutes with term-formers; π ·
f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(π · r1, . . . ,π · rn) (Deﬁnition 2.9)—this is reﬂected in the models when in Deﬁnition 4.6 we take fI to
be an equivariant function.
We can always pass term-formers atoms as arguments. For instance, abstraction over a base type τ can be axiomatised
as a term-former abs : (ν, τ )τ with a single axiom
b#X  abs(a, X) = abs(b, (b a) · X)
So abs(a, -) can be viewed as a ‘non-equivariant’ term-former. More on this in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.
Example: a theory of functions. A theory of functions is given as follows (this example is modiﬁed from [31, Figs. 1 and 4]).
Assume a name sort ν , a base sort τ , and term-formers var : (ν)τ , app : (τ , τ )τ , and lam : (ν, τ )τ . Sugar var(a) to a, app(r′, r)
to r′r, and lam(a, r) to λa.r. Then axioms are:
(βvar)  (λa.a)X = X
(β#) b#Z  (λb.Z)X = Z
(βapp)  (λa.(Z ′ Z))X = ((λa.Z ′)X)((λa.Z)X)
(βabs) b#X  (λa.(λb.Z))X = λb.((λa.Z)X)
(βid)  (λa.Z)a = Z
(α) b#Z  λb.(b a) · Z = λa.Z
Here is an example derivation, sketched out and written in natural deduction style to save space:
(a /∈ vars∅(b))
(Axα)
λa.b = λc.b
λb.λa.b = λb.λc.b (Reﬂ)a = a
(λb.(λa.b))a = (λb.(λc.b))a
(c /∈ fa∅(a))
(Axβabs)
(λb.(λc.b))a = λc.((λb.b)a)
(Axβvar)
(λb.b)a = a
λc.((λb.b)a) = λc.a
(Tran)
(λb.(λc.b))a = λc.a
(Tran)
(1)(λb.(λa.b))a = λc.a
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condition like b#Z in (β#) with a concrete choice of b ∈ A> (it does not matter which one). So we obtain the following
PNA theory, where b ∈A> and a ∈A<:
(βvar) (λa.a)X = X
(β#) (λb.Z)X = Z
(βapp)
(
λa.
(
Z ′ Z
))
X = ((λa.Z ′)X)((λa.Z)X)
(βabs)
(
λa.(λb.Z)
)
X = λb.((λa.Z)X)
(βid) (λa.Z)a = Z
(α) λb.(b a) · Z = λa.Z
Undecidability of semantic freshness in general. Equality and semantic freshness can encode arbitrary complexity. For instance,
consider two λ-terms r and s in the signature above (we do not even need unknowns). The question whether ∅  r = s
is derivable, is undecidable. Even restricted forms of equality have this power. Consider a λ-term r which encodes some
assertion and returns a if the answer is ‘yes’ and diverges if the answer is ‘no’. Then just using the judgement ∅  (c a) ·r = r
we can detect whether the problem encoded by r has answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’; this equality test is semantic freshness. Thus, this
restricted form of equality is also undecidable in general (more on semantic freshness later).
4. Denotations
We can give our logics a common denotation in nominal sets.
4.1. Deﬁnition of nominal sets
Deﬁnition 4.1. A set with a permutation action X is a pair (|X|, ·) of
• a carrier set |X| and
• a group action on the carrier set (P× |X|) → |X|, written inﬁx as π · x.
So, id · x = x and π · (π ′ · x) = (π ◦π ′) · x for every π and π ′ and every x ∈ |X|.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Say A ⊆A supports x ∈ |X| when for all permutations π , if π(a) = a for all a ∈ A then π · x = x.
Deﬁnition 4.3. A nominal set is a set with a permutation action such that every element has a unique least ﬁnite supporting
set supp(x), called the support of x.7
X, Y will range over nominal sets.
Deﬁnition 4.4. Call a function from |X| to |Y| equivariant when π · f (x) = f (π · x) for all x ∈ |X| and all permutations π .8
Lemma 4.5. Given nominal sets Xi for 1 i  n the following data deﬁnes a nominal set n1Xi :∣∣n1Xi
∣∣= |X1| × · · · × |Xn| π · (x1, . . . , xn) = (π · x1, . . . ,π · xn)
4.2. Denotation
Deﬁnition 4.6. A model I of a signature  = (AtomicSort,BaseSort,TermFormer,ar) (Deﬁnition 2.2) consists of the following
data:
• For each base sort τ a nominal set τI .
• For each term-former f of arity (α1, . . . ,αn)τ an equivariant function fI from n1αiI to τI , where νI =Aν .
Deﬁnition 4.7. A valuation ς to I assigns to each X an element ς(X) ∈ sort(X)I .
Call ς permissive when supp(ς(X)) ⊆A< for all X .
Deﬁnition 4.8. Suppose I is a model and ς is a valuation to I . Assign nominal terms denotations in I as follows:
aIς = aI π · XIς = π · ς(X)

f(r1, . . . , rn)
I
ς
= fI (r1Iς , . . . ,rnIς
)
7 In fact, if a ﬁnite supporting set exists then so does a unique least such. See [33, Proposition 3.4], or [21, Theorem 2.21].
8 So a function is equivariant when it is completely symmetric with respect to the permutation action.
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If ς is a permissive valuation then π · rIς = π · rIς .9
Deﬁnition 4.10.
• Write T;	 |NA r = s when for every model I and valuation ς to I , if supp(ς(X)) ⊆ fa	(X) for every X then rIς =
sIς .• Write U;	 |NEL r = s when for every model I and valuation ς to I , if supp(ς(X)) ⊆ fa	(X) for every X then
rIς = sIς (cf. Eq. (38) and Deﬁnition 6.3 of [8]).• Write U;	 |NEL a#r when for every model I and valuation ς to I , if supp(ς(X)) ⊆ fa	(X) for every X then a /∈
supp(rIς ) (cf. Eq. (38) and Deﬁnition 6.3 of [8]).
• Write V |PNA r = s when for every model I and permissive valuation ς to I , rIς = sIς .
4.2.1. Soundness and completeness for NA
Fix some model I and valuation ς to I .
Lemma 4.11. If supp(ς(X)) ⊆ fa	(X) for every X then supp(rIς ) ⊆ fa	(r).
Theorem 4.12. T;	 NA r = s if and only if T;	 |NA r = s.
4.2.2. Soundness and completeness for NEL
Theorem 4.13.
• U;	 NEL r = s if and only if U;	 |NEL r = s.
• U;	 NEL a#r if and only if U;	 |NEL a#r.
4.2.3. Soundness and completeness for PNA
Lemma 4.14. If ς is permissive (Deﬁnition 4.7) then supp(rIς ) ⊆ fa(r).
Theorem 4.15. V PNA r = s if and only if V |PNA r = s.
The proofs of the soundness part of Theorems 4.12, 4.13, and 4.15 are easy and more-or-less by construction. The proofs
of completeness are also easy by appropriate Herbrand constructions. In the literature, these results can be found as [30,
Theorems 4.24 and 4.39], [8, Theorems 7.4 and 10.10], and [22, Theorems 7.4.6 and 7.5.12].10
5. Translation between NEL and NA
5.1. Expressing semantic freshness in (permissive-)nominal algebra
5.1.1. NA and syntactic freshness
‘Free atoms of’ is an intensional judgement on syntax (Lemma 5.1) and is not implied by ‘not in the support of the
denotation of’ (Lemma 5.3). . .
Lemma 5.1. T;	 NA r = s does not imply that a ∈ fa	(r) if and only if a ∈ fa	(s).
Proof. Consider a theory with one name sort ν , one base sort τ , one term-former f with arity (ν)τ , and one axiom ∅ 
f(a) = f(b). Then a ∈ fa∅(f(a)) and a /∈ fa∅(f(b)). 
Deﬁnition 5.2. Write T;	 |NA a#r when for every model I and valuation ς to I , if supp(ς(X)) ⊆ fa	(X) for every X ,
then a /∈ supp(rIς ).
9 Why the extra condition? Consider a,a′ ∈ A> . If a ∈ supp(ς(X)) and a′ /∈ supp(ς(X)) then (a′ a) · XIς = XIς , which would be unsound for the
(Perm) rule of Fig. 4.
Because a ﬁnite permutation can ‘place’ any ﬁnite number of atoms outside of A< , the restriction that supp(ς(X)) ⊆A< does not affect expressivity. It
is not the case that permissive-nominal algebra ‘can only talk about atoms in A< ’.
10 The proof in [22] proved completeness with respect to permissive-nominal sets, which may have inﬁnite support. It is easy to replay the proof for
nominal sets models. A more abstract and interesting models-based approach is taken in a paper in preparation [23]. The result is the same, however we
prove it.
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Proof. Using the previous example, it is not hard to verify that T;	 |NA a#f(a), yet a ∈ fa∅(f(a)). 
5.1.2. NA and semantic freshness
. . . however ‘(b a) · x = x for fresh b’ is an extensional judgement (Lemma 5.4; this is the real meaning of the rule
identiﬁed in Section 11 of [8]) and is implied by ‘not in the support of the denotation of’ (Corollary 5.5).
Recall the notation 	,a#vars(r) from Notation 3.11.
Lemma 5.4. Suppose T;	,b#vars(r) NA (b a) · r = r and T;	 NA r = s.
Then T;	,b#vars(s) NA (b a) · s = s.
Proof. By routine calculations using Theorems 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of [30]. 
Corollary 5.5. T;	 |NA a#r if and only if T;	,b#vars(r) NA (b a) · r = r.
Proof. Write 	′ = 	,a#vars(r) and choose some fresh b (so b /∈ fa	′ (r)).
Suppose T;	 |NA a#r. By assumption if I is a model and ς is such that supp(ς(X)) ⊆ fa	′ (X) for every a#X ∈ 	′ , then
a /∈ supp(rIς ).
By assumption b /∈ fa	′ (r) so by Lemma 4.11 b /∈ supp(rIς ). It follows by Deﬁnition 4.2 that (b a) · rIς = rIς . By
Lemma 4.9 (b a) · rIς = rIς . By Completeness (the right-to-left part of Theorem 4.12) T;	′ NA (b a) · r = r.
The converse implication follows similarly, using Soundness (the left-to-right part of Theorem 4.12). 
Corollary 5.5 has appeared (at least) as Theorem 5.5 from [28], Lemma 4.51 from [30], and also as Theorem 5.5.7 of [5].
A corresponding result holds for PNA, and is even simpler to state:
Deﬁnition 5.6. Write V |PNA a#r when for every model I and permissive valuation ς to I , a /∈ supp(rIς ).
Corollary 5.7. V |PNA a#r if and only if V PNA (b a) · r = r, where we choose b /∈ fa(r).
5.2. Models
Deﬁnition 5.8. Given an NEL theory U create a new theory U′ with the same signature such that
• An axiom 	  r = s maps to itself.
• An axiom A = 	  a#r maps to A′ = 	,b#X1, . . . ,b#Xn  (b a) · r = r where {X1, . . . , Xn} is the set of unknowns
appearing in the axiom and b is fresh.
Theorem 5.9. The class of models deﬁned by U in NEL is equal to the class of models deﬁned by U′ in NA.
Proof. Using Corollary 5.5. For more details see [30, Section 5]. 
So by Theorem 5.9 for every derivable NEL freshness judgement there is a corresponding derivable NA equality judge-
ment, in a corresponding theory, which has the same meaning in the models.
Conversely, any NA theory is already an NEL theory, and it is not hard to prove the following adjoint to Theorem 5.9:
Theorem 5.10. The class of models deﬁned by U in NA is equal to the class of models deﬁned by U considered as an NEL theory.
5.3. Translation of derivations
The arguments above are not constructive; they do not show how individual derivations might translate. We now indicate
how to do this.
The idea is that NEL semantic freshness judgements transform to NA equality judgements of the form (b a) · r = r for
fresh b.
Consider some NEL derivation  of U′;	  r = s or U′;	  a#r. The challenge is to translate the freshness part. First, we
note down all the unknowns used in ; write these X1, . . . , Xn . We choose a fresh b that does not appear anywhere in 
and write 	′ for the freshness context which is 	 augmented with b#X1, . . . ,b#Xn .
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(AxA′)
U′;	′  (π ◦ (b a)) · (rθ) = π · (rθ)
Lemma 5.11. If U;	 NA r = s then U;	 NA π · r = π · s.
Proof. By a routine induction on derivations. See [30, Theorem 3.2.2]. 
An instance of (Trans#) translates to the following derivation-fragment, which for clarity we represent schematically; we
use Lemma 5.11 and rules (Symm), (Trans), and so on:
(b a) · s = (b a) · r (b a) · r = r r = s
(b a) · s = s
The rules (#1) and (#2) easily translate; we consider only the case of (#1). This uses the fact that (b a) · f(r1, . . . , rn) =
f((b a) · r1, . . . , (b a) · r1); again we indicate it schematically:
(b a) · ri = ri (1 i  n)
(Cong)
(b a) · f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(r1, . . . , rn)
What we now have is:
• From an NEL derivation of U;	  r = s an NA derivation of U′;	′  r = s, from which we can obtain a derivation of
U′;	  r = s, using (Fresh) repeatedly.
• From an NEL derivation of U;	  a#r an NA derivation of U′;	′  (b a) · r = r.
Translating an NA derivation to an NEL derivation is no harder. An NA derivation is almost an NEL derivation already,
except most notably for the different treatment of freshness assumptions in the axiom rule (Ax). We just use the fact that
(#1) and (#2) can emulate the inductive deﬁnition of fa	(r).
6. NA, NEL, and syntactic/semantic freshness
6.1. Notation for semantic freshness
We wrote 	  a#r in [28] where here we write a /∈ fa	(r). The notation here is designed to make it impossible to
misread the side-condition a /∈ fa	(r) as a logical judgement, as can happen to a reader exposed to the comments on
nominal algebra in [8] and [7] without further context.
Where did this notation come from? The notation 	  a#r was developed with Urban and Pitts in [40] and is the
established notation for nominal terms, used e.g. in nominal rewriting and αProlog [4,15]. Its use continues; see e.g. [2,38],
which are examples of quite a large literature.
When one considers equational reasoning from axioms, there is a design choice: should derivable freshness take the
equations in the theory into account? If so, then we also need explicit rules for reasoning about freshness from axioms that
generalise the Urban–Pitts–Gabbay style freshness judgement (and ought to be sound and complete for it); if not, we do not
need such rules. Either design choice is justiﬁable as a generalisation from the initial theory and notation of [40]; however,
in the case of NA the syntactic freshness reasoning (by design) no longer matches the semantics. In this sense, the 	  a#r
notation can be misleading and we have replaced it in this paper.
The choice is superﬁcial, in the sense that one can do without freshness axioms and judgements (NA). Thus, if we want
to prove something about NEL or NEL with equality only, we might be able to prove it about NA or PNA (which are smaller
systems) and lift to NEL by translation.
Semantic and syntactic freshness had already parted company with the introduction of nominal rewriting [15,16], where
the interaction of syntactic freshness with rewrites (directed equality) is a topic of great importance, notably for conﬂuence
properties. In particular we have studied closed rules [16] and uniform rules [15,16], where the interest is speciﬁcally how
rewrites can inﬂuence the free atoms of a term.
We do have the following result, which is not hard to prove:
Lemma 6.1. a /∈ fa	(r) if and only if a /∈ supp(rIς ), for everymodelI and valuation ς to that model.
Proof. It suﬃces to construct a Herbrand model out of closed syntax quotiented by α-equivalence, possibly adding term-
formers to ensure that we have enough closed terms. 
In addition, in permissive-nominal terms quotiented by α-equivalence, a /∈ fa(r) if and only if a is fresh for r in
permissive-nominal sets. That is off-topic for this paper; see [22] for more details.
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Three positions are taken regarding NEL and NA in [8] (which introduced NEL), [5] (Clouston’s PhD thesis), and [7] (which
is based on the second half of [5]):
• Position 1. “NA does not provide a complete axiomatisation of the semantic notion of [nominal] freshness within nominal sets.”
[8, Section 11]
• Position 2. “. . . freshness can be expressed in terms of equality, [so the difference between NA and NEL] amounts to different
design choices, rather than any deeper distinction [but] NEL’s choice is clearly . . . appropriate . . . for approaching freshness as a
ﬁrst-class subject of study.” [5, Section 8.2]
• Position 3. Semantic freshness is dropped from nominal equational logic. It is approached using equality alone [7, Fig. 1].
In the light of the maths we have seen so far we can note the following:
1. Nominal algebra provides a complete notion of semantic freshness. This is built in to the design and is noted explicitly
in Theorem 5.5 from [28], and also by Theorem 5.5.7 of [5] and by the use of NEL with equality only in the second half
of [5] and [7].
As mentioned in Section 6.1 the notation a /∈ fa	(r) is designed to make the confusion between a side-condition and a
logical judgement impossible.
Sadly this has more than historical interest, and confusion is still propagated in the literature today. Most recently
in [7, Section 7], Clouston writes “freshness in NA is sound, but not complete, for freshness in the underlying nominal sets
interpretation”.
We hope that by now, it is clear that this sentence is meaningless and rests on a category error.
2. Semantic freshness is a deﬁnitional extension of NA. Contrary to the quote given above, an explicit semantic freshness
judgement is not clearly appropriate.11 Nominal Lawvere Theories use as syntax NEL with equality only and the approach
to freshness uses equality only, after the manner of NA.
3. The semantic freshness judgement was eventually dropped, shifting from NEL to NEL with equality only.
The logic of [7] is called ‘nominal equational logic’. It should not be, since it is not the same as the logic of the same
name from [8]. We follow the terminology of [5] and call it NEL with equality only.
These logics are laid out for the reader to inspect and compare, in a uniform presentation and for the ﬁrst time together,
in Figs. 1, 2, and 3.
Remark 6.2. NEL and NEL with equality only are not truly equational. They are Horn clause logics, in which propositions
to the left of a turnstile are restricted to have (intuitively) the meaning ‘(b a) · x = x for fresh b’. These judgements are
expressive; e.g. in the presence of the right axioms semantic freshness can be undecidable as we saw in Section 3.5. Thus
Clouston wrote “freshness is a more complicated concept that must be deﬁned” [5, Section 5.5].
Remark 6.3. It may surprise the reader that the logic in [7] does use a syntactic freshness side-condition after all. It is just
a little hidden by the presentation: in our notation it is a /∈ atms(r).
We trace this back to [7]. In (Subst) in Fig. 5.4 of [7] there is a simultaneous choice of fresh atoms a¯i ; this notation is
explained in an unnumbered deﬁnition just before Remark 3.2 of that paper. Unpacking what this in syntax-directed terms
reveals a freshness judgement written a#r which is not written out in full, but which corresponds to a /∈ atms(r) from
Deﬁnition 3.4.
Remark 6.4 (a /∈ atms(r) and a /∈ fa	(r) ‘morally’ equal). The difference between a /∈ atms(r) and a /∈ fa	(r) is to some extent
an artefact. In the permissive-nominal terms framework of [22] atms(r) and fa(r) become equal. The inequality between
atms and fa here arises because our representation of syntax is more concrete than it absolutely needs to be; our syntax
‘remembers’ names of bound atoms, in the sense that [a]a and [b]b are distinct formal syntax, whereas in permissive-
nominal syntax they can be taken to be identical (just as we do for normal ﬁrst-order syntax).
There is a real sense in which NEL with equality only uses the same syntactic freshness judgement as NA. They look
different only because of how they are projected to concrete syntax. We predict that this point will become clearer with
time as the literature matures.
Remark 6.5. The computational content of fa	(r) also exists in the NEL family, in a certain sense.
11 In the theory. As usual, in an implementation we should put in whatever users want and, presumably, compile the richer language down to a core
system.
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freshness context with a#vars(r), and then produces an equality (b a) · r = r, which we recognise as the equality of Corol-
lary 5.5.
Solving this equality triggers a cascade of reasoning which follows the syntax-directed deﬁnition of fa	(r).
The reader can see this happen in (Perm) and (Ax) in Fig. 3. Returning to [7], choices of atoms a¯i disjoint from atms(r),
written a¯i#r in [7], are used to generate an equality assertion which is written out in full in [7, Eq. (9)].
One might debate which of these strategies is more computationally eﬃcient, but in any case NEL and NEL with equality
only do have a syntactic freshness judgement, accompanied by machinery which is at least as complicated as fa	(r).
Remark 6.6 ( Nat the meta-level). We can read ‘a /∈ atms(r)’ as ‘a is fresh’. But here is an interesting alternative reading: one
can argue that what is really happening in (Fresh) in Figs. 1 and 2, and in (Fresh), (Perm) and (Ax) in Fig. 3 (and in (Subst)
in Fig. 5.4 of [7]), is the Gabbay–Pitts Nquantiﬁer. By that reading, syntactic freshness is simulated by swapping plus an
incognito meta-level new-quantiﬁer.
6.3. Further comments
6.3.1. On the usefulness and necessity of reinterpretation
The NEL of this paper is a reinterpretation of Clouston and Pitts’s work. The presentation of NEL used a different syntax
from NA. Why reinterpret the syntax in this paper?
NEL uses a ‘cylindric’ style syntax (in the sense of cylindric algebra [34]). See Deﬁnition 4.2 of [8] for their syntax, and
Fig. 3 of [8] for their permutation and substitution actions. Compare with Deﬁnitions 2.5, 2.9, and 2.10 here.
Unfortunately, this choice of ‘non-standard syntax’ breaks compatibility with the large body of work on nominal terms,
and makes it diﬃcult to compare NEL work with the quite substantial body of work using nominal terms. One useful
product of this paper is a more explicit presentation of NEL which bridges the gap between these two bodies of literature.12
Providing an inherently ﬁnitely presentable NEL syntax is a good idea. There is nothing wrong with a more abstract
presentation, but a ﬁnite presentation of the syntax should be provided too, as a service to and courtesy to the rest of the
literature. This paper plugs that gap and uses the syntax to clearly compare the members of the (P)NA/NEL family, arguably
for the ﬁrst time.
There is also a little more. The cylindric style is that NEL almost always requires inﬁnite signatures; e.g. any non-
equivariance in the signature will immediately cause this, because there are inﬁnitely many atoms to consider. For imple-
mentation, some explicitly ﬁnitely presentable syntax for NEL is not only good practice but a necessity: users input ASCII
text, not inﬁnite sets. Furthermore, work on complexity like [3,37], depend on the ﬁnite presentability.
And ﬁnally, lest we forget, implementability was one of the motivations for nominal techniques in the ﬁrst place. In prin-
ciple, variables are optional and we could use combinators, but real implementations use variables and it was understanding
these variables that motivated the development of nominal sets in the ﬁrst place.
6.3.2. Non-equivariant term-formers
We continue the discussion of Remark 3.9. The syntax used in [8] uses non-equivariant term-formers.
Does this actually matter? Not for the logic. We explain how, in a moment.
But ﬁrst, suppose we want non-equivariant term-formers in the logics of this paper, after all. How would we go about
it?
• We can simply extend nominal terms with non-equivariant term-formers, and thus allow terms of the form (π ·
f )(r1, . . . , rn) alongside π · X in Deﬁnition 2.5. We would also need to take π · (f(r1, . . . , rn)) = (π · f)(π · r1, . . . ,π · rn)
in Deﬁnition 2.9. This possibility was discussed right back during the original design of nominal terms.
• We can admit a class of non-equivariant constant symbols, so even if term-formers are equivariant, some constant
symbols might not be. This is the approach taken in the PNL of [22], where in addition support can be inﬁnite.
In fact this does not matter for expressivity in an equational logic. Non-equivariant operation symbols can map to equiv-
ariant term-formers restricted to apply to a ﬁnite list of distinct atoms. A term-former f(-) with support {a1, . . . ,an} maps
to an equivariant term-former with arguments f′(a1, . . . ,an, -) (we discuss ‘junk’ in the next subsection). Complexity is mi-
grated between the sort system and the notion of term-former/operator (cf. the simple examples of neq and abs from
Section 3.5).
If the permutation action satisﬁes non-trivial equalities, then these are converted to axioms in the obvious way. For
instance, if we want a sort τ and constant symbols of sort τ that are isomorphic to unordered pairs of atoms from Aν , then
the translation would require a term-former f(ν, ν)τ along with a single axiom f(a,b) = f(b,a).
How this generalises to an arbitrary nominal set follows from a general result, Theorem 3.12 of [20], which describes
how every nominal set can be expressed as a disjoint sets union of orbits under the permutation action, and equalities
12 We do not consider the non-equivariant sorts used in some later NEL work. Typing systems for nominal terms remain an open topic.
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signature plus for each orbit a ﬁnite set of axioms, follows immediately. A translation of derivations between the system
with non-equivariant term-formers and the system with axioms for term-formers applied to distinct atoms, is rather easy
to construct (and resembles the more complex translation to eliminate ‘junk’ in the proof of Theorem 6.9).
Note that the axiomatic theory hidden in the permutation action can be non-trivial. Consider a nominal set which for
every program P and pair of atoms a and b contains an element Pa,b such that Pa,b = Pb,a if and only if P halts.
6.3.3. Junk in models
Continuing the previous point, if we emulate ‘a constant Ca,b with support {a,b}’ by taking a term-former C taking two
atoms as arguments and writing C(a,b), then we also admit the junk term C(a,a). It is not possible, with an equivariant
signature, to consider the term C(a,b) alone.
So in the translation from the NEL of [8] to the ‘NEL’ of this paper, some ‘junk’ is added to the models. Does this make
a difference? Not to the logic: the same non-junk equalities are derivable either way. We show how this works for NA:
Deﬁnition 6.7. Fix a signature  (Deﬁnition 2.2) and pick out some set of term-formers fi : (νi1, . . . , νini ,αi1, . . . ,αimi )τ for
i ∈ I; these are ‘pretending’ to be non-equivariant by taking atoms as arguments.
Say a term of the form fi(s1, . . . , sni , r1, . . . , rmi ) is junk when the set {s1, . . . , sni } does not consist of ni distinct atoms
(in the example above C(a,a) is junk and C(a,b) is not junk).
If a term r contains a junk subterm then say that r contains junk (so every term that is junk, contains junk, but not
every term that contains junk, is junk). Say a theory T contains junk when it contains an axiom that contains junk. Finally,
if a derivation contains a junk term then say the derivation contains junk.
We will prove a conservative extension result for the system in which junk is allowed, with respect to the system in
which no junk is allowed; this is Theorem 6.9. First, we need a key lemma about nominal algebra:
Lemma 6.8. If T;	 NA r = s and r : ν and s : ν then precisely one of the following holds:
• r = π · X and s = π ′ · X and a#X ∈ 	 for every a such that π(a) = π ′(a).
• r = a and s = a for some a ∈Aν .
Proof. By soundness and completeness of NA with respect to its models (Theorem 4.12), in which νI = Aν (Deﬁni-
tion 4.6).14 
Theorem 6.9. Suppose T, r, and s do not contain junk. Then T;	 NA r = s is derivable if and only if T;	 NA r = s has a derivation
that does not contain junk.
Proof. Clearly if T;	 NA r = s has a derivation  that does not contain junk then T;	 NA r = s has a derivation.
Suppose we have a derivation  of T;	 NA r = s, and suppose  contains junk. Note that T contains no junk, and
neither does r = s. We now perform a transformation on  speciﬁed as follows:
• For each of the designated term-formers fi choose a completely fresh set of atoms ai1, . . . ,aini (so these atoms do not
occur anywhere in ).
• Deﬁne a translation (-)∗ by a∗ = a, (π · X)∗ = π · X , f(r1, . . . , rn)∗ = f(r∗1, . . . , r∗n) if f(r1, . . . , rn) is not junk,15 and
fi(s1, . . . , sni , r1, . . . , rmi )∗ = fi(ai1, . . . ,aini , r∗1, . . . , r∗mi ) otherwise.• Finally, translate  by replacing r with r∗ and replacing any instance of (Cong) whose conclusion is junk, as follows:
1···
s1 = s′1 . . .
ni···
sni = s′ni . . .
mi···
rmi = r′mi
(Cong)
fi(s1, . . . , sni , r1, . . . , rmi ) = fi(s′1, . . . , s′ni , r′1, . . . , r′mi )
13 Any set with a group action can be so partitioned. And why ﬁnite? Because support is ﬁnite; we choose a representative x of the orbit with support
supp(x) = {a1, . . . ,an} and write an axiom π · f(a1, . . . ,an) = f(a1, . . . ,an) for any of the π such that π · x = x. An unsophisticated calculation gives an upper
bound of n! distinct axioms.
14 The important point here is that the interpretation of ν is always Aν , and aIς is always equal to a, not matter what the model and what axioms are
in T.
15 It might still contain junk, but that is handled recursively by (-)∗ .
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(Reﬂ)
ai1 = ai1 . . .
(Reﬂ)
aini = a′ini . . .
mi···
r∗mi = (r′mi )∗
(Cong).
fi(ai1, . . . ,aini , r
∗
1, . . . , r
∗
mi ) = fi(ai1, . . . ,aini , (r′1)∗, . . . , (r′mi )∗)
Note that if r contains no junk then r∗ = r, so this does not affect the conclusion of . Note also that Lemma 6.8 im-
plies that we do not have to consider the possibility in the replacement above that fi(s1, . . . , sni , r1, . . . , rmi ) is junk and
fi(s′1, . . . , s′ni , r
′
1, . . . , r
′
mi ) is not.
It is not hard to verify that this transformed labelled tree is a derivation. We consider the two interesting cases:
• For an instance of (Perm) we note that r′ contains junk if and only if (a b) · r′ does, and furthermore the junk is in the
same parts of the term, and because we chose our atoms {ai1, . . . ,aini } fresh, (a b) does not affect them. It follows that
(a b) · (r∗) = ((a b) · r)∗ . Also, again because we chose our atoms fresh, it follows that a,b /∈ r∗ .
• For an instance of (Axr′=s′ ) we change the relevant θ to θ∗ which maps X to θ(X)∗ . By assumption r′ and s′ in the
axiom do not contain junk, and this means in particular that each occurrence of fi in r′ and s′ is not at the head of a
junk term and so occurs applied to ni distinct atoms. It follows that (r′θ∗) = (r′θ)∗ and (s′θ∗) = (s′θ)∗ . Also, since the
atoms aij are chosen fresh θ∗ satisﬁes all the necessary freshness conditions.
The rest is routine. 
Junk is a common phenomenon. Models of Peano arithmetic admit non-standard elements which cannot be detected
from within the Peano theory itself, cf. also the upward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem [35]. Similarly models of Higher-Order
Logic come with function-spaces of various sizes.
Also similarly, by dropping atoms-abstraction [a]r from nominal terms we lost some control over models with respect
to the NA of [30]. This is discussed in [30], and NEL did the same in [6]. Though we can say in axioms ‘a is abstracted in
abs(a, r)’ (cf. Section 3.5) it is not possible (without negation or implication) to insist ‘and abs(a, r)Iς is exactly equal to
[a]rIς ’.
There is nothing wrong with non-equivariant term-formers (they give us extra models) but for designing a core equa-
tional reasoning system we can take them or leave them (the extra models do not affect the entailment relation). For more
expressive logics, this can matter more, and in fact things can get quite subtle; see for instance [22,23].
6.3.4. The judgement form
The NEL of [8] has just one judgement form, written ∇  a¯#t ≈ t′ : s. See Eq. (33) in Section 6 of [8]. Here ∇ is a
freshness context, a¯ is a ﬁnite set of atoms, t and t′ are terms, and s is a sort.
This difference does not matter. In this paper, that single judgement would be represented as ∇  a#t for each a in a¯,
and further ∇  t = t′ .
6.3.5. Natural deduction presentation
Early presentations of nominal algebra used natural deduction style derivations, rather than the sequent presentation
used in later publications and here, see e.g. [18]. When writing out examples, the natural deduction style can be a lot more
compact and easier to typeset; we used it in this paper in Eq. (1) in Section 3.5.
This is purely a matter of presentation.
7. PNA versus NA
Permissive-nominal techniques were introduced in [13,14]. PNA is genuinely different from NA and NEL (with or without
equality) in two respects:
• PNA has a slightly but signiﬁcantly different proof-theory because Fig. 4 has no (Fresh) rule.
We could also lose the (Perm) by a quotient of syntax; see the next point.
• The permissive-nominal treatment of nominal terms does not involve a mutable freshness context 	 (this is related
to the previous point). α-equivalence can be taken as ‘just quotient by α-equivalence’, like in traditional syntax. The
interested reader is referred to [22].
PNA is part of a broader ‘permissive’ programme by the author with Mulligan and Dowek. We have only presented here a
simpliﬁed fragment of the more general theory surveyed in [22], applied speciﬁcally to equational reasoning.
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we can think of permissive-nominal reasoning as being nominal reasoning in an inﬁnite freshness context in which a#X for
every a ∈A> and every X .
Comparing Figs. 2, 3, 1, and 4, we see a decrease in complexity; Fig. 4 differs from normal ﬁrst-order algebra only in
adding the π in the axiom rule. In permissive-nominal techniques, names and binding become structural properties of
syntax instead of the quasi-logical—though still syntax-directed—deﬁnitions-in-context that they have on nominal terms.
This means in plain English that we can ‘just quotient’ by α-equivalence just as we do in ﬁrst- and higher-order syntax, and
we do not have to worry about the non-structural (Fresh) rule since this is replaced by the use of A< and A> .
This is currently the author’s preferred technology for nominal reasoning. Empirically, we seem to get a clearer view of
the underlying mathematics.
The permissive-nominal syntax of this paper is simpliﬁed. In other work, e.g. [22], we allow X with permission sets which
are sets of the form π ·A< .16 In effect, this paper considers a syntax in which all X have permission set A< . This does not
affect expressivity because we can emulate unknowns with different permission sets by writing π · X .
Remark 7.1. The reader who wants to see how PNA reasoning maps to NA reasoning can consult [14, Section 4]. We brieﬂy
sketch here how an NA theory can be translated to a PNA theory. It is simplest to do this if we allow ourselves unknowns
with permission sets of the form π · A<; by the remark above, this can always be emulated (at some cost in notational
convenience).
Consider an axiom 	  r = s. For each X ∈ vars(r, s), suppose {a | a#X ∈ 	} = {a1, . . . ,an} = A. Choose some fresh atoms
{b1, . . . ,bn} = B . Assign X a permission set (A< \ A) ∪ B , where we arrange things such that A ⊆A< and B ⊆A> .
Then 	  r = s translates to r = s.
8. Atoms-abstraction in (P)NA/NEL
The NA in [28] included abstraction as primitive; the (P)NA in this paper does not. That atoms-abstraction can be treated
as a theory in equality and freshness is a matter of reading and understanding the deﬁnitions, such as Eq. (35) in [33] or
the reduction rule (≈?-abstraction-2) from Fig. 3 in [40].
The observation is implicit in the structure of nominal algebra: see e.g. the (perm) rule of CORE in [28] which does not
mention abstraction or the two example derivations on p. 6, or e.g. Lemma 7.3 part 4 of [27]. A subsection is devoted to the
topic in [30, Section 5.1].
NEL underwent a similar development. Abstraction sorts are absent in [8] but can be recovered from the more complex
non-equivariant operation symbols. The observation that abstraction is a theory was made explicit in [6], which is based on
Clouston’s PhD, see e.g. [5, Example 4.3.4] and surrounding text.
Having atoms-abstraction is convenient, so we can express in the signature that a term-former binds (like λ([a]r)). As
Clouston and Pitts note “atom-abstraction arities could be added to NEL and probably should be, since making binding
information part of a signature rather than part of a theory’s axioms is a good idea” [8, Section 11]. There are some other
good reasons to include atoms-abstraction:
• NA/NEL can express by a simple axiom that a term-former of arity (ν, τ )τ binds, but not that it is precisely atoms-
abstraction (this is also discussed in [6, Section 8], and see below).
This seems to matter. For instance, in [19] which proved an HSPA theorem for nominal algebra, atoms-abstraction
emerged from denotational considerations. The proof of the HSPA theorem used a free algebra construction, so to prove
HSPA it seems necessary to consider terms with atoms-abstraction, even if the original logic had not included it.
Kurz and Petris¸an revisited this theorem [36] using their own methods, and they too encountered some diﬃculties with
atoms-abstraction (see their Section 5).
• Not only abstraction can be axiomatised in NA—so can permutation, substitution, or atom-for-atom renaming. For some
applications it might even be useful to drop permutations entirely, but to keep binding; for instance, if we only care
about ground terms.
A host of design decisions are involved here. Yet all the original applications of nominal techniques involved atoms-
abstraction, so in the presence of all these choices we should verify in detail—and without any handwaving—that the
most common amongst them, works.
This is why atoms-abstraction has been taken as primitive in NA publications.
Interestingly, PNA enriched with a class of inﬁnite permutations which we call shift-permutations, satisﬁes a stronger
HSP theorem [22]. Permissive-nominal syntax with shift has strictly greater expressivity than (P)NA/NEL. Using shift has
other advantages; this is a topic of current research.
As a distinct issue, Clouston and Pitts’s semantic framework of Nominal Lawvere Theories is unable to account directly
for atoms-abstraction. Clouston confuses two distinct issues when he presents this in terms of a hypothetical NA/NEL split
16 We also allow atoms-abstraction, non-equivariant constant symbols, and certain classes of inﬁnite permutations, all of which is off-topic for this paper.
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of the design choices of NA, most notably explicit binding sorts”.
NA and NEL have both been considered with and without atoms-abstraction; [30, Section 5.1] and [6, Section 6] discuss
this and show that expressivity is not lost or gained either way. The issue is not with the language or signature.
The issue here is with the extremely rich structure of nominal sets. Nominal Lawvere Theories are not currently expres-
sive enough to capture the notion ‘atoms-abstraction, precisely’. We cannot express a negative assertion that we only have
binding (that is, a theory can express that an atom is abstracted, but cannot specify that that is all that happens).
This ‘negative’ part of atoms-abstraction cannot be captured by NA/NEL, either, so NA/NEL is not able to detect whether
a term-former that claims to be atoms-abstraction, really ‘is’ atoms-abstraction; this is why expressivity is not lost whether
we hard-wire atoms-abstraction into the derivation system or simply write axioms.
As Clouston rightly goes on to remark, if we had a total destructor for atoms-abstraction (instead of the partial destructor
given by atoms-concretion) then the framework might be expressive enough to identify ‘real’ atoms-abstraction.
On this topic, the nominal renaming sets of [25] are a relevant structure, and it is current research by the author with
Dowek to apply these to the family of languages considered in this paper.
9. Other ‘nominal’ algebras
Moving away from NEL/(P)NA, two other logics with broadly similar goals are under development, and we will brieﬂy
sketch them.
Support encoded as multiple sorts. Kurz and Petris¸an encode nominal sets in many-sorted ﬁrst-order algebra [36]. For
each ﬁnite supporting set they take a sort, and they write a collection of axioms describing how permutations interact
with sorts/supporting sets, and with term-formers. In this way, it is possible to translate any nominal algebra theory to
a(n inﬁnite, but ﬁnitely-presentable) ﬁrst-order theory.
The immediate reason for doing this was to use theorems of ﬁrst-order model theory to obtain theorems about nominal
models, such as the HSP theorem. However, this might also turn out to be a suitable method for designing purpose-built
logics for reasoning on nominal sets.
Broadly speaking, the message here is: ‘analysis of nominal reasoning using many-sorted ﬁrst-order syntax and seman-
tics’.
Term equational logic. Fiore and Hur have developed a general framework for generating syntax, equational logic, and sound
and complete equational systems [17]. The kinds of logics considered in this paper are claimed to be special cases of this
framework (though the mathematics is suﬃciently complex that this would probably be quite hard to make completely
formal). Broadly speaking this seems plausible, with the caveat that if this is so then the framework of Fiore and Hur could
probably also be obtained by adding axioms to the base logics here.
The real interest of [17], it seems to this author, is the attempt to explicitly parameterise everything—syntax, semantics,
and proofs—over diagrams in category theory. This is in keeping with Fiore’s general style of mathematics, and with a
broader current in theoretical computer science, running parallel to the ‘sets and functions between them’ approach favoured
by this author, to present everything as far as possible in abstract, categorical terms. The message here is: ‘parameterise
everything as diagrams’. We do not see that there is any real difference in generality, but there is a marked difference in
style, and if this different approach can be made to work then it may be possible to apply, in the style of category theory,
general diagrammatic arguments to obtain concise proofs of theorems.
10. Conclusion
We have sketched out a design space for equational logics over nominal terms—what a mathematician would call algebra
[9]. A number of design choices have arisen: semantic freshness or syntactic freshness; atoms-abstraction or no atoms-
abstraction; equivariant function-symbols or non-equivariant function-symbols; freshness contexts or permission sets.
These choices are equivalent in expressivity, though PNA has a signiﬁcantly different treatment of freshness and poten-
tially of α-equivalence.
The goal, when nominal algebra was designed in 2005, was to produce something simple, clear, user-friendly, and com-
patible with previous work on nominal terms and nominal rewriting [15,40]. This author’s long-standing belief is that we
succeeded: NA and PNA are the simplest possible core logics in their class. Other design decisions are certainly possible, and
we do not necessarily promote NA and PNA directly for implementation—but the natural variations add complexity without
increasing expressivity, and they do not seem to improve on or greatly change the character of the logic.
We believe that this paper offers the best overview of this family of logics, their clearest and most direct presentation,
and the most accurate and best-informed commentary on their design, in existence at the time of writing.17 We hope the
results and discussion here will help readers to understand the design of these logics, and that our detailed discussion will
17 . . . for which I am indebted to two anonymous referees, without whose tireless constructive criticism this paper would have been far less rigorous.
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partial selection of the literature: [5,7,8,12,14,17,21–23,26–28,30,32,33,36].
An additional design choice not discussed in this paper is whether to have ﬁnite or inﬁnite permutations18 and whether
to allow inﬁnitely-supported constants. This does increase expressivity; see [22,23].
Permissive-nominal algebra (PNA) was introduced in [32] in 2009 and is sketched in this paper and described in detail
in [22]. This may be the simplest ‘nominal algebra’ yet. In the permissive-nominal syntax, judgements take the self-evidently
purely equational form r = s and the derivation rules are even simpler than those of NA. PNA is the author’s currently
preferred nominal equational logic, though NA is more familiar and somewhat easier to deﬁne (no arbitrary partitions of A
to confuse the reader).
freshness goes back to [33] and its deﬁning equality for freshness (Eq. (13))
a /∈ supp(x) ⇐⇒ Nb.(b a) · x = x.
N(meaning ‘for all but ﬁnitely many’) delivers the kind of freshness that syntactic freshness does: something guaranteed
suﬃciently fresh, but possibly fresher than we absolutely need (cf. Lemma 5.3). This author and Mathijssen designed NA
with exactly this in mind.
(P)NA/NEL all have semantics in nominal sets, and because they are all equivalent they also have semantics in Nominal
Lawvere Theories. It would be interesting to reconsider Nominal Lawvere Theories in a permissive-nominal context. In
particular, we speculate that the ordering on permission sets and shift-permutation discussed e.g. in [22] might be one way
to generate a destructor for atoms-abstraction and so extend (permissive) Nominal Lawvere Theories to atoms-abstraction.
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